COMMON INTENTION AND COMMON OBJECT

(UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY)
[Sections 34 And 149, P.P.C.]
Common object. Accused attracted to the spot on the spur of the moment, taking part in free fight resulting in death of 2 on complainant side and injuries to P.Ws. Held the accused could not share common intention with each other. Sudden fight, each accused held liable for his own act. (DB) 1976 P.Cr.LJ 1067 Hidayat Ullah etc.
To have same intention independently of each other is not to have common intention. Common intention requires a pre-arranged plan. There must be a prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each may have the same intention, namely the intention to kill and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention as there was no prior meeting of mind to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that each would be individually liable for whatever injury be caused but none could be convicted for the act of the other vicariously. PLD 1965 SC (Ind.) 176 Pandurang etc.
Same or similar intention and common intention. Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention; the partition which divides their bounds is often very thin; nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial, and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice. In their Lordships' view, the inference of common intention within the meaning of the term in section 34 should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case. It must be shown that the criminal act was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, "Common intention" within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. (PC) ILR (1945) 26 Lah. 367 Mahboob Shah v. King-Emperor.
Common intention, intention is a state of mind which is not susceptible of direct proof and can only be inferred from attendant circumstances of crime. Common intention can usually be inferred from motive, pre-concert and pre-arrangement which cannot always be proved by direct evidence. Held, common intention has to be gathered from facts disclosed in evidence and surrounding circumstances. PLJ 1996 S.C. 746, Muhammad Arshad etc.
Section 34, P.P.C. not to be applied lightly. vicarious liability cannot be visited unless some strong circumstance exist showing common intention. Mere presence of a person on the spot does not attract the provision of section 34, P.P.C. (SC) 1978 SCMR 49. Hassan Din v. Muhammad Mushtaq etc. = PLJ 1978 SC 429.
Presumption under second part of Sec. 149, PPC not to be readily presumed. Second part of Sec. 149, PPC is that the members of the unlawful Assembly knew that such offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of that common object. Where common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit house-trespass only by show of force, although all members of unlawful assembly were armed with fire-arms yet only one member of the assembly fired a shot killing the deceased, while others caused no harm to anyone. In such a case, the accused must be shown to have known, through cogent facts and reasoning regarding offence charged being likely to be committed. Appellants acquitted of offence under section 302/149, PPC. PLJ 1987 SC 291 Muqadar etc.
Common object of unlawful assembly is a question of fact whether knowledge on the part of each member can be presumed from his conduct or role played by him. PLJ 1987 SCMR 291 Muqadar etc.
Common intention ought to be determined from such known fact and circumstances which existed before the commencement of the criminal act as the criminal act itself is committed in furtherance of the common intention (DB) PLD 1949 Lah. 453 Gheba v. Crown.
Intention to be gathered from the conduct of the accused and attending circumstances. (FC) PLD 1954 FC 77 Bahar v. Crown. 1969 SCMR 599 = 1969 P.Cr.LJ 1153.
No intention to kill on the part of the accused could be inferred from the evidence, who had disassociated himself after giving one blow to the deceased. 1993 SCMR 1934, Piran Ditta.
Common intention to be judged from all the circumstances of the case and not from one fact only. The co-accused had caused the fatal blow before the appellant arrived. As the appellant caused only simple injuries on non-vital parts of body, he was convicted u/S. 324, PPC only and awarded 3 years' R.I. 1985 SCMR 1422 Pervaiz Akhtar.
Principle, section 34, PPC, is merely explanatory and embodies in the Code the ordinary common sense principle that if two or more persons intentionally do a thing jointly it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually. Section 34 does not create any offence and it is not necessary to specify it in the charge. (DB) ILR (1941) 22 Lah. 423 Waryam Singh v. Crown.
Common intention. Several assailants armed with lethal weapons, one taking no part in actual killing but causing injury to another of the deceased's party. Killing may be held to be in furtherance of the common intention of all. (SC) PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 207 Hayat.
"Common intention" and "common object" distinction. Section 34 and section 149, PPC. Section 34, Penal Code will in no case apply to an offence failing under section 304 (II), PPC. It may apply to case under section 304 (1). (DB) PLD 1950 Pesh. 60 Sahibzada v. Crown (Contra) (SC) 1969 P.Cr.LJ 1090.
Common intention is a necessary ingredient under section 34, PPC. Whereas it is immaterial under section 149, PPC. (DB) PLD 1956 Lah. 854 Feroz.
When the offence is known to be likely to follow in the prosecution of the common object section 39, PPC, applies but section 34, PPC, may not apply (DB) PLD 1956 Lah. 157 Fateh Sher v. Crown.
When the offence is likely consequence of common intention, it is not sufficient to attract section 34, PPC. Prosecution must prove that the offence committed was covered by common intention. (DB) PLD 1964 Kar. 38 Khalil.
Section 34, PPC not applicable in offence under section 304, Part II. Death of deceased caused by 3 accused jointly assaulting and administering prolonged beating to deceased to extort confession from him. Evidence as to which of three accused delivered fatal injury immaterial. Held, all liable to conviction under section 304 (II) read with section 34, PPC (SC) 1969 SCMR 490 Siraj Mia.
Section 34, PPC not applicable to cases under section 304 (II), PPC. (PC) AIR 1945 PC 118. (DB) PLD 1950 Pesh. 60 Sahibzada v. Crown.
Common intention or object may develop suddenly. Several persons belonging to one party having gathered at one spot may suddenly develop common intention or common object. (SC) PLD 1975 SC 351 Khair Muhammad.
Commo object of causing death cannot be presumed where one accused uses wrong side of hatchet on the head causing death. The co-accused convicted u/S. 325, PPC. PLD 1985 Lah. 584. Lal Khan etc.
Spur of the moment. Common intention can be formed at the spur of the moment. (SC) 1973 SCMR 503, Sherzaman etc. (DB) PLJ 1978 SC 45 Kakai.
Common object can be developed at the spur of the moment by an unlawful assembly. (SC) PLD 1976 SC 303 Khair Muhammad.
Development of common intention on the spur of moment can be presumed in certain cases but reverse can also be assumed. An accused may change his mind at the last moment. If the co-accused does not prevent the commission of the offence it does not necessarily mean that he shared common intention. Roused passion may allow the accused to act to save the situation and reflexes may not be under calm control. Law does not punish reflexes. PLD 1988 SC 86 Bashir Ahmed.
Pre-conceived plan not necessary to bring case under section 34, common intention may develop on the spot. Even if common intention is not borne out by facts, accused may be taken to be aiding one another in the crime i.e., they be guilty of abetment. (DB) PLD 1955 Lah. 575 Sultan Muhammad v. Crown. (DB) PLD 1960 Kar. 797 Akhtari Begum.
Pre-arranged plan is not always necessary, common intention may develop in the course of transaction constituting the offence and may be gathered from the number and nature of injuries. (DB) PLD 1954 Lah. 382.
Sudden fight. Mere fact that the fight was sudden does not make section 34 inapplicable when the action of the accused shows common intention. (DB) PLD 1961 Lah. 348. Muhammad Akbar.
" Provisions of section 34 are not attracted in a sudden fight. (DB) PLD 1963 Pesh. 118 Yousaf.
Complainant party appeared at the scene by chance and altercation was neither anticipated nor pre-planned. Common intention could not be inferred. Simply because the accused were armed with a shot-gun, a spear and a sota premeditation could not be attributed to them. Each accused was liable for his own act. 1991 SCMR 241. Sher Khan etc.
Grave and sudden provocation when mother was being beaten by the deceased. Sudden occurrence without premeditation, held, Sec. 34 PPC would not apply. Conviction altered from Sec. 302 PPC to u/S. 304 (1) PPC. 1992 SCMR 1517, Muhammad Iqbal etc.
In sudden fight, question of furtherance of common intention does not arise. Although the appellants had chhuries in their dubbs not openly displaying at the occurrence and causing no serious injury to the opposite party. Held, appellants not liable u/S. 34, PPC. PLJ 1983 SC 104 Misbah-ud-Din.
Section 34 PPC does not apply in a sudden fight without premeditation, none, taking undue advantage, each accused would be responsible for his own act. 1992 SCMR 1517, Muhammad Iqbal etc.
Sudden occurrence at the spur of the moment each accused is liable for his own individual act. Accused inflicting fatal injury sentenced to life imprisonment u/S. 302, P.P.C. while accused inflicting simple injuries sentenced u/S. 323, PPC. (DB) PLJ 1986 Cr.C. (Lah.) 460. Manzoor etc.
In sudden and free fight each participant would be liable for his own individual act. PLJ 1995 S.C. 311, Manzoor Masih.
Unexpected attack by one accused on deceased. No question arises of S. 34 each accused responsible for his own individual acts. (DB) PLD 1951 Lah. 222. Nazar Hussain etc.
Chance encounter and use of knives. A, B and C charged with assault and murder of D.A and B used knives at D, C caused a fist blow on a companion of D, C not knowing that A and B had knives. Accused appeared to have met deceased by chance. C given benefit of doubt and acquitted section 34 not applicable. (DB) PLD 1971 Kar. 239 Abdul Hakim. (DB) 1971 P.Cr.LJ 424 Muhammad Anwar.
Barchhi with co-accused and common intention. When one of the co-accused is armed with a barchhi and other co-accused join him, then all those who joined the accused armed with barchhi must share the common intention attributable to him. 1987 SCMR 270. Amir etc.
Dagger concealed in loin cloth and sudden fight. No evidence on record to indicate that the accused shouting lalkara knew that the accused causing fatal injuries carried a dagger concealed in his loin cloth. Accused making lalkara could not be held to have facilitated deceased's murder or to have common intention to kill the deceased, in the circumstances, section 34, held, not applicable. (DB) 1971 P.Cr.LJ 530 Muhammad Latif etc.
Individual responsibility. Neither party coming with intention of committing murder or even starting fight but both parties prepared to meet any contingency. Fight leading to a death. Held, free fight and each accused responsible for his own act. 1974 P.Cr.LJ 77 Pissand etc.
No right of defence in free fight nor Sec. 149, PPC applicable. 1980 P.Cr.LJ 245.
Free fight, rule of vicarious liability not applicable; when no particular role was attributed to the petitioners, the Supreme Court acquitted them. 1990 SCMR 340 Sadiq etc.
Free fight. Accused coming to demand price of fodder from deceased and in heat of moment using their usual weapon of avocation in ensuing fight between parties. Each accused held responsible for his own act. Section 149, PPC not applicable. (DB) 1971 P.Cr.LJ 592, Taj Muhammad etc. 1977 Cr.LJ 706 Fateh Muhammad etc.
Where both the parties had come for trial of strength in free fight, each participant is responsible for his own action and there is no right of self-defence. Sec. 34 PPC is not applicable 1994 P.Cr.LJ 101, Imam Bux etc.
" In a free fight section 149, P.P.C does not apply. Each accused is responsible for his own individual act. The accused whom simple injuries were attributed in a murder case, granted bail. PLJ 1975 Cr.C. (Lah.) 418.
" Some members of unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, caused serious injuries resulting in death. Held that since words "such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed" in Sec. 149 are also followed by the words "in prosecution of that object" in order to hold all the members liable for murder under second part of Sec. 149 it was necessary for the prosecution to show that the members of that assembly not merely knew that death was likely to be caused, but further that it was likely to be caused in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. That the object of the assembly was merely to give a beating to their opponents, held the offence committed was u/S. 326, Penal Code. (DB) 47 Cr.LJ 391 Muhammad etc. v. Crown AIR 1947 Lah. 106.
Section 149, pitched battle, each responsible for his own acts. Both parties making preparation for pitched battle and free fight took place, Section 149, P.P.C. not applicable. Each assailant to be punished for his individual act. 1973 P.Cr.LJ 924 Nazar Hussain.
Vicarious liability. It is not essential that there must be an overt action in addition to physical presence and knowledge for vicarious liability. (SC) 1976 SCMR 20 Haji etc.
Sec. 34 P.P.C. vicarious liability. Three appellants real brothers who had a common motive/grievance against the deceased. All the 3 appellants came together to the spot, two of them armed with guns and 3rd with a knife, held, act of appellant No. 1 firing at the deceased was in furtherance of the common intention fully shared by other appellants. Held, further that the appellants had been rightly convicted for vicarious liability. PLJ 1995 S.C. 684, Muhammad Arshad etc.
Accused unarmed and present. `Y' one of several accused unarmed and no part in murder assigned to him. Mere presence of Y on the spot is not incriminating. Acquitted. (DB) 1972 P.Cr.LJ 107 State v. Muhammad Hassan.
No common intention to cause death. Accused gave soti blow to deceased without sharing common intention of co-accused. Soti blows were given after the deceased had sustained fatal injuries by co-accused and had no knowledge that the co-accused had knife with him. Accused acquitted of charge u/S. 302, PPC. 1989 SCMR 144 Abdul Rasheed.
Mere presence of the accused on the spot is not sufficient for showing his prior concert with other accused to commit crime. (DB) PLD 1974 Cr.C. (BJ) 434.
Mere presence of accused not enough for conviction under section 34, PPC. Proof of some overt act on part of each accused in furtherance of common intention is necessary. (DB) 1969 SCMR 454 Hassan. (DB) 1972 P.Cr.LJ 107.
Section 34, PPC. does not permit conviction of one accused under section 304 (II), PPC. and the other under section 325/34, PPC. Barendra Kumar Ghose, AIR 1935 PC 1 ref. PLD 1959 Lah. 753 Ghuncha Gul.
Murder and abduction. Original plan only to abduct. One accused standing outside the house, others go in and pulling girl outside Courtyard killing her. Accused standing outside to be inculpated in completed offence of abduction but not under section 364/34, PPC. Barendra Kumar Ghose ref. (SC) PLD 1960 SC 254 Ghulam Qadir.
Sections 34 and 509, PPC. Party of young men following a group of college girls on a picnic at country side. Actual acts attributed to members of party, but particularly to one accused only. Others held guilty under section 34, PPC. (SC) PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 201. Muhammad Sharif.
Section 149. 13 accused, only two spears in possession of the party. Held, every member of the party knew that murder was likely to be committed in prosecution of common object. (SC) PLD 1962 SC 450 Muhammad etc.
" Some members of unlawful assembly armed with daggers, some with dangs, and others empty-handed. No evidence that those not armed with daggers helped in any way in the commission of the crime. Held, common intention to murder only confined to those armed with daggers and committing murder. (DB) 1968 P.Cr.LJ 645 Rafiq etc.
Sections 148, 149, 302/34. Five persons accused under sections 302/149/148 and 324, PPC. Three accused acquitted and remaining two found guilty under section 302/34, PPC. On appeal sentence of A confirmed by High Court but conviction of N causing simple injuries altered to one under section 326/34, PPC. After the acquittal of 3 accused section 149 did not apply and N having been found not to have acted in concert with A in furtherance of common intention. Conviction of N under section 326/34, PPC. on mere ground that since he knew that his companion A was armed with a spear he should have known that there was probability of causing grievous hurt held unjustified. Conviction of N altered to one under section 324/34, P.P.C. (SC) 1969 SCMR 724 = 1969 P.Cr.LJ 1426. Nur Muhammad v. Crown.
Section 149, PPC. (a) The offence must be committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly, (b) the offence must be such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Other acts are not included. Allowing Slogans having different senses to be availed of to serve to provide clue to required intention is unsafe. (DB) PLD 1971 Kar. 68 Amir Hussain etc.
People rendering any assistance that may be needed and therefore, members of an unlawful assembly are equally guilty whether unarmed and taking no part in the assault. 1971 P.Cr.LJ 291 (Kar.) Amir Hussain etc.
Section 149, PPC is applicable when established that at least 6 or 7 persons participated in the crime though the identity of 3 or 4 of them could not be established. (DB) 47 Cr.LJ 909 Magal v. Emp. AIR 1946 Lah. 309.
Who caused injury. Accused held guilty constructively u/S. 326/149, PPC. Question who caused the grievous injury is immaterial. (SC) 1976 SCMR 336 Babar Shah. (SC) PLD 1977 SC 508; PLJ 1977 SC 407.
Common intention to murder when injuries on the legs only of the deceased. Appellants firing together with their rifles, two out of three shots hit the deceased on his legs causing his death Held, conviction u/S. 302/34, PPC justified. 1987 SCMR 254. Rehman Shah etc.
Section 149 not applicable. Only one accused member of the unlawful assembly, giving one fatal injury not the head of the deceased, all other accused consciously avoiding blows on vital parts of the deceased. Such other accused, held did not have common intention of their co-accused and could not be liable for his act. (DB) 1971 P.Cr.LJ 541 Hayat and 10 others.
Application of section 149, PPC. does not depend on five accused at least being ultimately convicted. (DB) PLD 1954 Lah. 783 Juma v. Crown.
Proof of intention to kill must be established by prosecution. Failure to establish intention gives rise to reasonable doubt. Benefit of such doubt always goes to the accused. (DB) PLJ 1974 Kar. 106 Shaukat Ali etc.
Direct proof of common intention is generally not available. Common intention can be formed at spur of the moment. (SC) 1973 SCMR 69 Shamsher etc.
Common object of the assembly to be proved. Common object of the assembly to give a beating, and offence which the members knew to be likely to be committed was grievous hurt. Two members of the assembly convicted under section 302/34, P.P.C. Special intention or knowledge in the minds of such members of the unlawful assembly must be proved. (FC) PLD 1953 FC 35 Fazal Elahi v. Crown.
Common object of the assembly not to cause death. All accused cannot be held guilty. (DB) PLD 1952 Lah. 609 Mirza v. Crown.
Common intention, section 34, case-law discussed and held, where a number of accused armed with deadly weapons assaulted the complainant party one accused attacking and using blunt side of hatchet only, while another causing simple injuries with lathi. Only one accused causing fatal blow with a knife. Held the accused causing fatal blow guilty under section 302, PPC while others were guilty under section 326/34, P.P.C. only. (DB) PLD 1972 Lah. 19 Athar Khan etc.
Doer of partial act would be considered as the doer of the entire act irrespective of the fact as to who caused the fatal blow, when he attack is preplanned and deliberate under section 34, P.P.C. (DB) PLD 1972 Kar. 88 Muhammad Bhai.
Proof. Common intention not generally susceptible of direct proof. Common intention can be formed spontaneously at spur of the moment. (SC) 1973 SCMR 69 Shamsher etc.
Whether members of the unlawful assembly guilty of the same offence as the principal offender. When a mob sets out with deadly weapons the inference is that at least grievous hurt is the natural result of the use of such weapons. In such a case if a member commits murder while other members cause simple hurts only the other members can be convicted under section 326, Penal Code. (DB) 48 Cr.LJ 209 Uait Narain Singh v. Emp. 228 IC 368 (DB) 48 Cr.LJ 269 Faiz Bakhsh v. Emp. 228 IC 623.
Knowledge of likelihood of hurt and actual hurt make all members equally liable for hurt. AIR 1926 Lah. 516. Data Ram etc.
Knowledge of members of unlawful assembly can be presumed that murder was likely to be committed in the execution of the common object when members of such assembly are armed with deadly weapons. 1984 SCMR 1069. Saeed etc.
Unlawful Assembly u/S. 149, PPC, and knowledge of common object. No one is a member of an unlawful assembly unless he is aware of the facts that render the assembly unlawful and intentionally join or continue in it. The Court should find out the initial purpose of the unlawful assembly and inference should not be made on mere acts. 1984 SCMR 823. Ahmed Din etc.
Vicarious liability (Sec. 149, PPC). Appellants related to each other and having strong motive, forming unlawful assembly, held, case being of day-light murder, there being no question of mistaken identity or any inherent improbability regarding their participation, guilt of accused established beyond reasonable doubt. PLJ 1984 SC 27. Muhammad Ali.
Section 149, PPC word "KNOW". Word "Know" in the Sec. does not mean "might have known". Author of fatal blow not known. The unlawful assembly cannot be presumed that it knew that death was likely to be caused by simple injuries when there was no intention to kill. Convicted u/S. 325 instead of Sec. 302, PPC. (DB) AIR 1926 Lah. 419 Dial Singh.
Chhuri hidden under shirt by co-accused. The other accused cannot be saddled with responsibility u/S. 34, PPC. 1983 SCMR 336. Khuda Bakhsh etc.
Co-accused not knowing that the accused would use knife and cause fatal injury. Appellant acquitted of liability u/S. 302/34, PPC. 1983 SCMR 420. Ghulam Hussain.
Knife from dub. Knife taken out of dub by an accused at spur of moment. Death caused by knife injuries an individual act. The companions may not be knowing that the other man carried a knife. Therefore, section 34, PPC is not applicable. (SC) PLD 1964 SC 177 Shahab Din.
Knife in dub. Section 34 envisages some kind of pre-planning although common intention to commit offence may some time develop even during the progress of the transaction. Appellant not shown to have had knowledge of his brother carrying a knife in his dub. Facts held, created impression that the appellant had the intention of only be labouring the deceased and not to kill him out right. Conviction altered from 302/34 to P.P.C. 323 (SC) 1977 SCMR 106, Yasin.
Pistol. Vicarious liability, the accused had no knowledge that the co-accused had a pistol. Acquittal upheld. 1993 SCMR 891, State v. Jamil-uz-Zaman.
Common intention, co-accused pulling out pistol and firing at the deceased. Held, accused may not be knowing that co-accused had a pistol Common intention cannot be inferred. (DB) PLJ 1983 Cr.C. (Pesh.) 149. Iftikhar Hussain etc.
No knowledge whether co-accused carried revolver or knife. Accused not himself armed with deadly weapon nor knowing that the co-accused carried a revolver or knife. Accused given benefit of doubt and acquitted. PLJ 1977 Kar. 223. Muhammad Saeed, PLJ 1993 Cr.C. (SAC) 230, State v. Jamil-uz-Zaman etc.
Knowledge of deadly weapon being carried by co-accused wanting. Appellants did not know that the absconding accused had a knife and revolver with him. Section 34, PPC not applicable. Benefit of doubt given. (DB) 1974 P.Cr.LJ 254 Muhammad Saeed (DB) 1974 P.Cr.LJ 473 Barkat Ali (DB) 1974 P.Cr.LJ 420 Ghalib Pervez.
Accused armed with lathi accompanying an accused armed with shotgun who kills the deceased, held, shares common intention with the killer armed with the gun. (SC) 1971 SCMR 693 Majid.
Not armed with deadly weapon. When an accused is not armed with a deadly weapon he cannot be convicted under section 148 by virtue of section 149, P.P.C. However, if a member of the unlawful assembly causes a grievous hurt the other members are constructively liable. 43 Cr.LJ 745 In re Mathusami etc.
Six accused with the common object of abducting a girl, armed with hatchets, spear and sticks attacked the other party, took away the girl two persons of the other party were injured and died in hospital. Held, the common object of the unlawful assembly was the abduction of the girl, and as they were armed with sharp-edged weapons, they could be credited with the knowledge that in the process of achieving the common object grievous injuries with sharp-edged weapon were likely to be caused. The appellants were convicted under section 326/149, P.P.C. (DB) PLD 1949 Lah. 453 Gheba v. Crown.
Temporary absence. Four persons went armed with guns to commit robbery. Two robbers went away from the house to get the owner and in their absence two robbers remaining in the house, one of them murdered a son of the house owner. Held, all robbers were guilty of murder including the two temporarily absent from the scene of murder. (DB) ILR (1933) 14 Lah. 814 Inder Singh v. Crown.
Standing outside the door. Accused standing outside the door held to be inculpated in the complete offence of abduction. (SC) PLD 1960 SC 254 Ghulam Qadir.
Standing outside the door. "Even if the appellant did nothing as the stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in crimes as in other things, "they also serve who only stand and wait." (PC) AIR 1925 PC 1 Barendera Kumar Ghose v. King Emperor 52 IA 40. (SC) 1970 P.Cr.LJ. 1073 Fazal etc.
Non-mention of section 34 or 149 in the charge makes no difference if the facts of the case justify it and there has been no failure of justice, the accused, can be convicted of the substantive offence read with section 34/149. (DB) Cr.LJ. 140 Kanwar Pal Singh.
Omission of section 34 from the charge makes no different where two or more accused do an act jointly intending one result. (FC) PLD 1955 FC 378 Khuda Bux v. Crown.
Merely going to the spot armed with hatchets and a stick does not give rise to a necessary inference of common intention with other accused, keeping in view the circumstance of the case. (SC) 1977 SCMR 7. Muhammad Khan v. Khizer Hayat.
Mere fact of accused being armed with weapons at the time of occurrence does not give rise to the inference that they had common intention to kill. PLD 1977 Kar. 18 Soomar etc. PLJ 1977 Kar. 111.
Common intention and ineffective fire. When the solitary fatal injury of the effective shot cannot be attributed with certainty to one of the two or more assailants whose participation in the attack otherwise stands established by satisfactory evidence non-particularisation of the fatal injury could at best be a valid ground for award of lesser penalty. (SC) PLD 1977 SC 446. Muhammad Khan.
Common intention: Gunshot missing mark cannot bring the case within exception. Such person cannot escape in vicarious liability even though the fatal shot is not caused by him. (SC) 1977 SCMR 70. Dalmir v. Akbar etc.
In furtherance of common intention accused had given a simple injury to the deceased, his acquittal was set aside and he was sentenced u/S. (1)(34) PPC and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment 1993 SCMR 2114, Muhammad Siddique.