Ss. 19(3), 23, 32, Third Sched., Entry No.4, Serial No. (iii)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 497, 526, 528---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 109, 148 & 149---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13(2a)---Firing in Court premises---Post-arrest bail---Jurisdiction---Transfer of case from a Court of ordinary jurisdiction to anti-terrorism Court---Scope---During proceedings of the case, it was observed that place of occurrence in the present case was a court premises and injury had been caused by firing---Entry-4 of the Third Schedule of the anti-terrorism Act, 1997 clearly indicated that offences mentioned thereunder were exclusively triable by the anti-terrorism Court---Under said entry at Serial No. iii, offence of firing in the court premises was mentioned, therefore, despite the offence being result of personal vendetta where offence of terrorism was not attracted, it shall be triable by the anti-terrorism Court---Challan of present case had been put before the Court of Magistrate who though did not have jurisdiction but commenced the trial and entertained the bail petition as well---Counsel for the accused-petitioner submitted that he would not press the petition provided the case be transferred to anti-terrorism Court, so that he could move the bail petition before such Court---Though by virtue of S. 32 of anti-terrorism Act, 1997, an anti-terrorism Court is deemed to be a Court of Sessions but as the case was entrusted to the Magistrate by the Sessions Judge under S. 17 of Cr.P.C. and was also empowered to withdraw a case from the Court of Magistrate under S. 528 of Cr.P.C, therefore, Magistrate shall stay the proceedings and will submit case, with a brief report explaining its nature, to the Sessions Judge for onward transmission to the anti-terrorism Court for its opinion---An anti-terrorism Court for that purpose was deemed as Magistrate authorized under S. 190, Cr.P.C. which gave powers to take cognizance of an offence on police report, private complaint and upon his own information---On taking cognizance by the anti-terrorism Court, it could decide the jurisdiction either to assume it under S. 19(3) of anti-terrorism Act, 1997, or take action under S. 23 of the said Act for transfer of case back to Court of ordinary jurisdiction and thereafter concerned Court of Magistrate could recommence the trial from the stage it was stayed under S. 346, Cr.P.C.---Course for transfer of case under S. 526, Cr.P.C. was also available, if the case was being tried by a Magistrate or Court of Session---High Court under S. 526(3), Cr.P.C. is empowered to transfer the case from Court of ordinary jurisdiction to anti-terrorism Court---Criminal miscellaneous petition was allowed and case was transferred to the Court of anti-terrorism Court---Accused could move bail petition before the anti-terrorism Court---Bail application was disposed of accordingly .PCrLJ 2024 LAHORE 658
Ss. 11EE(4), 21-L & Fourth Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 512, 87 & 88---Proscription of person---Conviction in absentia---Fair trial---Scope---Accused placed in Fourth Schedule to the anti-terrorism Act, 1997, violating terms of his bond by absconding---Prosecution case was that the name of accused was placed on the list of Fourth Schedule of the anti-terrorism Act, 1997, however, by violating the terms and conditions of the surety bonds submitted by him, he proceeded to foreign country and shifted there---Trial of the accused was carried out in his absence---Perusal of the record reflected that the personal attendance of the accused was not dispensed with rather he was tried and convicted in absentia without pleader of his own choice---Right to be represented by counsel of own choice was given by the Constitution of Pakistan, under Art. 10(1)---Further, there was possibility that the accused did not deliberately evade the process of criminal justice system, because his failure to appear before the trial Court, as and when required by the Trial Court, was due to lack of knowledge or some other reasons beyond his control---Even otherwise, if it was assumed that as a means to circumvent the process of criminal justice system, the accused deliberately absconded, even in that eventuality he could not have been tried and convicted in absentia---Rather, Trial Court could merely record evidence against him as envisaged under S. 512, Cr.P.C., after satisfying itself by adhering to the provisions of Ss. 87/88, Cr.P.C., that the accused had, in fact, absconded himself and there was no likelihood of his joining the trial proceedings in near future---Purpose of S. 512, Cr.P.C., was merely to preserve the evidence of a witness for an eventuality where protection was given to the deposition of such witness who might not be alive at the time of appearance of the accused or might have become incapable of giving evidence or attendance of said witness could not be procured without any delay, expense or inconvenience---Trial conducted in absentia violated both constitutional guarantees enshrined under Arts. 4, 8, 9, 10 & 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, and principles of natural justice---Thus, the trial of the accused in absentia was illegal, unwarranted and of no legal effect---Hence, appeal was allowed by setting aside impugned judgment and case was remanded to the Trial Court for its retrial in accordance with the law. PCrLJ 2024 LAHORE 183
Ss. 8, 9, 11-F(2), 11-G & 11-W---Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred, membership of proscribed organization, support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization, projection of proscribed organization---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Material extracted or retrieved from mobile phone recovered from possession of accused---Inconsequential---Accused was charged for distributing banned books, magazines and stickers for propagation of his banned organization---Prosecution's stance was that criminal liability of accused could be proved through material extracted or retrieved from mobile phone recovered from his possession on the day of raid---Material placed on record as well as Forensic Science Agency Report with respect to extraction of such material from the mobile phones was examined---Prosecution had also attached with the record a USB allegedly containing images, audios, videos, chat, call log etc., retrieved from the phone---Said evidence could not be used against the accused due to the reason that images retrieved from mobile phone were not put to the accused in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., and USB was not played in the Court during the statement of any witness so as to prove its contents---Extraction of data from a personal mobile phone, even of an accused, without his consent was not a good practice as it was opposed to constitutional guarantee of right to privacy---If the accused was not ready to accord consent, then at least permission from Magistrate should have been taken---Though in present case, anti-terrorism Court supervised the processes of investigation whenever needed, but no such permission was found in the record nor prosecution had shown the same, therefore, retrieval of data from mobile phone of accused by Forensic Science Agency without the consent of accused amounted to self-incrimination prohibited under Art. 13 of the Constitution---Such evidence was ruled out from consideration---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. PCrLJ 2024 LAHORE 1
Accused were charged for committing murder of three persons of the complainant party by firing and due to such firing, fear spread in the village---Motive as set up by the prosecution was that sister of deceased being already married lady had eloped with accused "S" and contracted marriage with him two years prior to the occurrence without the consent/blessing of her brothers and parents---Accused persons were under constant threat at the hands of deceased to harm his sister and under that threat, they committed the occurrence---Motive part of the occurrence was proved by the prosecution through cogent and convincing piece of evidence rather it was admitted by the defence by putting certain questions during cross-examination upon the eye-witnesses as well as in their statements recorded under S. 342, Cr.P.C.---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case against the accused "S" and "J" without any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction to the extent of said accused persons was accordingly dismissed MLD.2024 Lahore 576
Ss. 302(b), 324, 396, 353, 186, 412, 341, 225 & 148---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Murderous assault, acts of terrorism--- ---After their arrest, the accused persons were identified by the witnesses during identification parade, which was conducted under the supervision of a Judicial Magistrate---Said Magistrate categorically stated that an injured witness had identified the accused in unambiguous terms and the process was repeated twice so that no ambiguity could be left and after completion of identification parade, he prepared the form and then issued the certificate---Medical evidence available on the record corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased and the injured witnesses was concerned---According to the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, the empties were found fired from the pistols recovered from the accused persons---Neither the defence seriously disputed the motive part of the prosecution story nor the witnesses were cross-examined on such aspect of the matter---Jail petitions were dismissed, leave was refused, and the sentences of death awarded to the accused persons were maintained. 2023 SCMR 900 (ALI TAJ vs State)
Ss. 302(b), 324, 186 & 353---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Murder of police official while on official duty---Reappraisal of evidence--- Contents of FIR, statement of prosecution witnesses of ocular account were corroborated by the medical evidence---Accused was apprehended at the spot by the police officials soon after the occurrence leaving no ambiguity qua his involvement in the crime---Weapon of offence recovered from the accused was transmitted to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory without any delay in its dispatch---Report of Forensic Science Laboratory further confirmed that the empties recovered from the spot matched with the weapon recovered from the accused---Appeal against conviction was dismissed. 2023 SCMR 2016 (MUHAMMAD HANIF vs State)
S. 7(ff)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 5---Acts of terrorism, possession of explosives, detonators and safety fuses---Reappraisal of evidence---Police officials/witnesses appeared to prove the factum of recovery whereas Bomb Disposal Commander/witness gave his report to the effect that the detonators and safety fuses were alive---Testimonies of said witnesses were reliable, straightforward and confidence inspiring, and they had no enmity with the accused to falsely implicate him in the present case---Parcel containing sample of recovered explosive substance was sent to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory and according to the report of the Agency the sample contained explosive material---Conviction and sentences passed against the accused were maintained---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. 2023 SCMR 1299 (NAZIR AHMED vs State)
---Present case was the outcome of personal egoistic approach and there was no design or purpose of destabilizing the government, disturbing the society or hurting a section of the society with a view to achieve objectives which were essentially political, ideological or religious, therefore, provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were not applicable in the present case---Appeals were allowed, and accused persons were acquitted of the charge. 2023 SCMR 16 (Nawab Siraj Ali vs. State)
---Moreover one of the accused present in the vehicle was a female with a child in her lap---Supreme Court converted convictions of accused persons under section 365-A to section 365, P.P.C. and their sentences of imprisonment for life were reduced to 7-years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.50,000 each, whereas their convictions under section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were set aside---Appeals were partly allowed. 2022 SCMR 1225 (Shah Zaib vs. State)
---Held, that jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and the High Court was concurrent in nature---High Court while adjudicating the matter of pre-arrest bail had given cogent reasons especially when it was admitted that one of the deceased was himself a District and Sessions Judge, therefore, any order passed either way would have been considered prejudicial because of the reason that the deceased was member of the district judiciary---Even otherwise, the accused had not availed the remedy before the Session Court, which was available to him while agitating his grievance before the High Court, therefore, he lost one opportunity causing no prejudice to the complainant party---Petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the accused directly before the High Court was competent. 2022 SCMR 676 (Abdul Majid Afridi vs. State)
---Occurrence result of personal vendetta---No premeditation for the assault---Specific motive to create terror or insecurity amongst the society lacking---Provision of section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would not be attracted in such circumstances. 2022 SCMR 1494 (Muneer Malik vs. State)
Acid thrown on a victim inside a mosque---Conviction of accused under section 7(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was set-aside, however his conviction under section 336-B of P.P.C. was maintained---Appeal was partly allowed. 2022 SCMR 1102 (Ghulam Abbas vs : State)
---Injury caused to the police personnel was not due to direct conflict with the law enforcing agencies, rather as wife of accused was in custody of the police constable the injury caused to the constable could be result of misdirected shot due to heat of passion---Even otherwise the trial Court had convicted the accused under Ss. 337-D & 324, P.P.C. for causing injury on the person of the police personnel and the said injured had also affected a compromise with the accused and had forgiven him and also waived his right to collect Arsh---Provisions of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were not attracted in the present case, therefore, the conviction and sentence recorded under S. 7 of the said Act was set aside---Furthermore when the parties had compromised the offence under Ss. 302(b), 337-D & 324, P.P.C. the only punishment left for the accused was under S. 353, P.P.C., which was not compoundable---However, since the accused had already undergone the period of his sentence of 2 years imprisonment, Supreme Court gave directions for his release, and acquitted him of the charge of murder and causing injury on the person of the police constable --- Jail petition was converted into appeal and partly allowed accordingly. 2022 SCMR 18 (Muhammad Akram vs State)
Ss. 6(2)(e) & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-A---Kidnapping or abduction for ransom---Transfer of case from court of ordinary jurisdiction to Anti-Terrorism Court on the orders of the High Court---Legality---Allegation against accused and co-accused persons was that they disguised in police uniforms ostensibly arrested and handcuffed the respondent, where after they attempted to transfer the respondent and his wife to another city by kidnapping them; they also snatched valuables including cash and gold ornaments from the respondent and his wife, and when a contingent of Highway Patrolling Police was attracted to the scene and rescued the family, the accused managed to escape with the loot---High Court by transferring the case to an Anti-Terrorism Court had discreetly attended the controversy leaving the fate of the case to be finally decided after recording statements of the prosecution witnesses, which course was correct in the face of accusations leveled by the respondent and his wife who allegedly endured the ordeal, with an option to the accused to re-agitate the issue afresh on the basis thereof before the Anti-Terrorism Court, if need be---View taken by the High Court did not suffer from any jurisdictional error or flaw and, thus, called for no interference---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.2021 SCMR 136
Ss. 13(2) & 23---Power of Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC Court) under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, to transfer a case from ATC Court to ordinary criminal court---Scope---Authority of the ATC Court to transfer the case only exercisable after it had taken cognizance of the case---Cognizance of the case---Meaning and scope---ATC Court would be said to have taken "cognizance of the case" when on the receipt of the challan along with the material placed therewith by the prosecution, it took judicial notice thereon by the conscious application of mind and took positive steps to indicate that the trial of the case was to follow---Such steps need not necessarily be recorded as judicial orders; what was essential was that the orders so passed or steps taken reflected that ATC Court was to proceed with the trial.2020 PLD 427
Ss. 6 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b)---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to court of ordinary jurisdiction---"Terrorism"---Scope---Personal dispute---Female medical student allegedly murdered over refusal of marriage---Held, that there were no benign murders nor the aftermaths of violence endured by its victims and anguish suffered by their families could be quantified in an empirical gauge---Magnitude of every murder and concomitant loss impacted the surroundings differently, which inevitably were gripped by fear and shock, however, the intensity of brutality and loss of life, consequent thereupon, by themselves did not bring a violent act within the contemplated purview of "terrorism"---"Terrorism" was a distinct phenomena achieved through violent means and ends other than settlement of personal scores---While the tragedy in the present case that befell upon the deceased girl evolved profound shock and deserved to be appropriately visited on the strength of evidence, so as to ensure justice to her family, it nonetheless, could not be equated with "terrorism"---Case was withdrawn from the Anti-Terrorism Court and entrusted to the concerned Sessions Judge, who was directed to conclude the trial in jail premises by recording evidence of the remaining witnesses---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. 2020 SCMR 1422
S. 15---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Possession of unlicensed weapon, kidnapping for ransom---Reappraisal of evidence---During the raid for recovery of abductee, the accused was apprehended on the spot while guarding the abductee who was tied in chains in the basement of a house belonging to the accused---Raiding party on searching of the accused also got recovered from his exclusive possession a pistol with twelve (12) live rounds---Pistol was without number and the accused was unable to show licence of the same---Expert opinion in relation to the weapon showed that the same was in working order---Prosecution had proved its case through reliable and truthful witnesses of the recovery of pistol, corroborated by the documentary evidence in the shape of recovery memo, and the statement of arms expert regarding working condition of the pistol---Both the Courts below rightly concurred with each other regarding the guilt of the accused---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave refused. 2021 SCMR 162 (Fawad Khan vs. State)
Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4(b), 5 & 6---Terrorism, kidnapping or abduction for ransom, possessing explosives---Offences mentioned under Entry No. 4 to Third Sched. of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Conviction for such offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Scope---Offence of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under S.365-A, P.P.C. was included in Entry No. 4 of the Third Sched. to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and kidnapping for ransom was also one of the actions specified in S.7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Abduction or kidnapping for ransom was a heinous offence but the scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 showed that an ordinary case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under S.365-A, P.P.C. was merely triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but if kidnapping for ransom was committed with the design or purpose mentioned in cl. (b) or cl. (c) of subsection (1) of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 then such offence amounted to terrorism attracting S.7(e) of that Act---PLD 2020 SC 61
Nothing was available on the record to show that the accused wanted to create fear or insecurity or terror in or around the Court premises---After shooting the deceased the accused did not offer resistance and was arrested by the police along with the weapon of offence---Since the accused had committed the offence to avenge the murder committed by the deceased, his action would not fall under the ambit of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Conviction of accused under S. 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was set aside, in circumstances. 2020 SCMR 78
S. 9---Possession of pamphlets containing content inciting violence against a particular sect---Reappraisal of evidence---Contents of the pamphlets were repugnant and abhorrent, capable of causing most grievous offence---Said pamphlets contravened all limits of decency, an obligation sanctimoniously upheld by every faith---anti- terrorism Court had rightly convicted the accused under S. 9 of the anti- terrorism Act, 1997 and sentenced him to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.100,000---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2019 SCMR 1646
Every act of violence triggered fear and panic with collateral impact on the surroundings; but this by itself would not bring even the most violent act to fall within the mischief of "terrorism " as contemplated by the anti- terrorism Act, 1997---Accused's conviction and sentence under S. 7(a) of the anti- terrorism Act, 1997, was set aside, however his conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C and award of death sentence consequent thereupon was upheld---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2019 SCMR 1362
Cell phone data confirmed conversation between the accused and the complainant, and there was hardly any time or occasion for the family of victim to concoct or cook up a story on suspicions or consultations---Investigative conclusions also pointed towards the accused---Complainant and his brother, with no axe to grind, were cross examined at length, but no discrepancies were found in their statements---No reason existed to suspect accused's identity or entertain theory of substitution---Accused's guilt was proved to the hilt on the basis of chain of circumstances, well synchronized with one another and intrinsically confidence inspiring---Accused had been rightly convicted and sentenced to death given the brutality inflicted upon the abducted-child---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2019 SCMR 1330
S. 124-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 11 & 12---'Edict' or 'fatwa'---Person issuing an edict or fatwa, which harmed another or put another in harm's way---Such person must be criminally prosecuted under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and/or the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. PLD 2019 SC 318 SUO MOTU CASE NO.7 OF 2017
S. 7---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4 & 5---Possessing explosives to carry out terrorist activities---Suggestions and recommendations given by the Supreme Court for effective investigation of terrorism cases and for prevention of such crimes recorded. 2018 SCMR 495 INTEKHAB AHMAD ABBASI vs State
Ss. 302 & 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7(a) & 7(e)---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping for ransom---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of ransom amount --- Bank notes of the ransom amount were not marked or signed by any Magistrate, hence its alleged recovery by the police becomes suspect---Accused was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt---Appeal was allowed, conviction and sentence of accused were set-aside and he was acquitted of the charge. PLD 2018 SC 813 MUHAMMAD ABID vs State
S. 302(b)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 & 7---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Qatl-i-amd and terrorism---Accused was convicted by Trial Court and sentenced to death on six counts, which was affirmed by High Court---Validity---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court in order to reappraise the evidence. 2018 SCMR 397 SUPREME-COURT MUHAMMAD ABBAS vs State
Ss. 364-A, 376, 377, 302(b) & 201---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Kidnapping or abducting a person under the age of fourteen, rape, sodomy, qatl-i-amd, causing disappearance of evidence of offence, act of terrorism---Voluntary and true confession of guilt---Accused allegedly kidnapped a minor girl, where after he subjected her to sodomy and rape, before murdering her---When the charge was framed by the Trial Court against the accused he had pleaded guilty as charged and on that occasion he recorded a detailed confessional statement wherein he had admitted almost every aspect of the case alleged against him---Despite pleading guilty to the charge and making of a confessional statement the Trial Court decided to proceed with recording of evidence and during the trial statements of as many as thirty two (32) prosecution witnesses were recorded and many other pieces of evidence were brought on the record---Accused, in his statement recorded under S. 342, Cr.P.C. had once again admitted almost all the vital pieces of evidence produced by the prosecution against him as correct and had once again admitted his guilt unreservedly---Counsel for the accused had only prayed for some lenience to be shown to the accused in the matter of his sentence and no argument had been advanced before the Trial Court challenging the merits of the prosecution's case---In his memorandum of appeal filed by the accused before the High Court once again only lenience in the matter of sentence had been prayed for by the accused without questioning his convictions recorded by the Trial Court---Only during arguments before the High Court the counsel for the accused had maintained that admission of guilt by the accused before the Trial Court was a result of coercion but during such arguments he had not provided any detail regarding coercion applied against the accused so as to extract a confession---Apart from the guilty plea and confession of accused the CCTV footages, photographs, DNA tests and the medical evidence brought on record proved that the confession made by the accused was not only voluntary but also true---Guilt of the accused had been proved to the hilt---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed in circumstances and leave was refused. 2018 SCMR 1372
S. 7(a)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 34 & 109---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Act of terrorism, qatl-i-amd, common intention, abetment---Whether Anti-Terrorism Court had jurisdiction in a case---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced by the Anti-Terrorism Court for an offence under S. 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 read with Ss. 302, 109 & 34, P.P.C.---High Court remanded the case to a court of ordinary jurisdiction for a de novo trial because, according to the High Court, the case was not one of terrorism and, therefore, an Anti-Terrorism Court had no jurisdiction to try the same; held, that while passing the impugned order the High Court had ignored some important decisions of the Supreme Court, the Anti-Terrorism Court and of the High Court itself passed in the earlier stages of present case---Soon after present incident took place the Supreme Court took suo motu notice of the matter and remained seized of those proceedings under Art.184(3) of the Constitution till after a challan was submitted by the local police before an Anti-Terrorism Court---Supreme Court had not only blessed submission of the challan of the case before an Anti-Terrorism Court but it had issued detailed guidelines as to how the case was to be tried by the relevant Anti-Terrorism Court and as to how such trial was to be monitored by the Monitoring Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court vis-à-vis cases of terrorism---Said suo motu proceedings were not challenged by any party through a review petition---High Court in its impugned order did not make any mention of the suo motu proceedings of the Supreme Court---Furthermore during the pendency of the trial of the present case before the Anti-Terrorism Court one of the accused persons had filed an application seeking transfer of the case to a court of ordinary jurisdiction, which application was dismissed by the Anti-Terrorism Court through a detailed order---Said order of Anti-Terrorism Court was challenged by the accused before the High Court through a revision petition, which was also dismissed through an elaborate order---Dismissal of revision petition was challenged by the accused before the Supreme Court, which dismissed the petition for leave to appeal at a time when the Anti-Terrorism Court had already concluded the trial and had convicted and sentenced the accused persons---Said orders of the Anti-Terrorism Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court were ignored by the Bench of the High Court that passed the impugned order---Impugned order passed by the High Court remanding the criminal case to a court of ordinary jurisdiction for a de novo trial as well as all the post-remand proceedings before the Trial Court were set aside by the Supreme Court---Supreme Court directed that all concerned appeals and applications shall be deemed to be pending before the High Court and the same shall be finally decided on their merits at the Court's earliest convenience; that the accused persons convicted in the relevant criminal case by an Anti-Terrorism Court should be retaken into custody as their admission to bail during the post-remand proceedings was nullity in the eyes of law, and that the previous order of the Supreme Court putting the names of the accused on the Exit Control List shall continue to hold the field till the time the main matters remanded to the High Court were finally disposed of---Suo motu case was disposed of accordingly. PLD 2018 SC 351
Ss. 302(b), 34, 337-F(iii), 337-F(v) & 337-F(vi)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, common intention, act of terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Occurrence was an incident of terrorism in which firing had been resorted to and hand grenades had been hurled at a Rangers party resulting in two deaths and five persons getting injured---Proceedings of the test identification parade showed that the present accused persons had been picked up by the eye-witnesses with reference to the roles played by them during the occurrence---Even during the trial the eye-witnesses produced by the prosecution had pointed towards the present accused persons amongst the culprits who had actively participated in the main incident---Ocular account of the occurrence had been furnished before the Trial Court by as many as six witnesses out of whom two had the stamp of injuries on their bodies vouchsafing their presence at the scene of the crime at the relevant time---Consistent ocular account furnished by the said eye-witnesses had received sufficient support from the medical evidence---Guilt of the accused persons had been established beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal to the extent of conviction of accused persons was dismissed accordingly. 2018 SCMR 372
Ss. 302(b), 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7(a), 7(b) & 7(h)---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of public function, common intention, acts of terrorism---Appeal against acquittal---Reappraisal of evidence---Accused and his co-accused allegedly exchanged fire with a police party, as a result of which the co-accused and a police official lost their lives---According to the prosecution the initial firing at the police had been resorted to by the accused and co-accused and through such firing one member of the police force had been critically injured at the spot, then the question was as to why the police in firing back chose co-accused as the only target---Site plan clearly showed that if the police party wanted to target the accused as well then there was nothing to stop it from causing injuries to him---Such circumstances indicated a real possibility that it was only the co-accused who had fired at the police party and in response the police party had fired back at him and that accused had not fired at all and surrendered before the police without causing any harm to anybody---Four crime-empties secured from the place of occurrence did match with the pistol statedly recovered from the custody of the accused at the time of his surrender but it could not be lost sight of the fact that the said pistol had been recovered at the spot and it was not difficult for the police party to manufacture as many crime-empties from the said recovered pistol as it wanted so as to strengthen its case against the accused---Circumstances of the case clearly indicated that after surrender of accused some engineering had been resorted to by the prosecution so as to cook up a story qua the accused's role and to bolster the same through contrived circumstances---No occasion was found to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court in favour of the accused---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed accordingly. 2018 SCMR 1590
Ss. 9 & 11-W---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Suspension of execution of sentence---Scope---Release of accused on bail pending appeal---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Petitioner/convict contended that appeal preferred by him having not been decided within the period statutorily provided under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thus, case for his release on bail through suspension of execution of sentence stood made out---Prosecution contended that petitioner was not entitled for release as he was convicted on the charge of inciting division and disharmony in already volatile society---High Court, though, was vested with ample authority to release convict in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, however, power of such amplitude was to be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in cases of extreme hardship---Hardship of prisoner could be quantified to deny him extenuation, however, his release on bail on account of non-disposal of appeal within the prescribed period would defeat the very purpose of the special law---Constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked to defeat legislative intent---High Court directed the office to post the main case with a convenient dispatch---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly. YLR 2018 Lah 1464
Ss. 6 & 23---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to court of ordinary jurisdiction---Scope---Personal enmity over property---Admittedly there was a dispute of a plot where the occurrence took place---Prosecution's own case was that the complainant had filed a civil suit and on his application for initiation of contempt proceedings against the accused persons, a bailiff of the Court was appointed---Application of contempt of court and appointment of bailiff triggered the enmity which resulted in the present occurrence---Allegedly five persons fired specifically at complainant's wife (deceased) hitting on her legs, but till that time there was no allegation of creating terror and insecurity in the general public---Subsequently, it was alleged that 26 persons, in order to create terror and insecurity in the general public, made indiscriminate firing, but, such allegation was not supported from any source as neither any crime empty was recovered from the place of occurrence nor anybody else received even a scratch on his person due to said indiscriminate firing---Due to the alleged indiscriminate firing not a single bullet hit on the walls of the plot in question which were 2.3 feet high---Furthermore, according to the complainant party, two police constables, who were guarding the complainant, were present at the place of occurrence, but it was not alleged by the prosecution that they were restrained by the accused persons to discharge their duties or anybody fired upon them or threatened them---Bailiff of the court and police constables, never claimed that they were fired at or they were threatened by the accused persons, instead they were subsequently introduced as accused persons in the case for abatement---Perusal of the allegations levelled in the FIR, the material so collected by the investigating officer and other surrounding circumstances of the case, showed that the present case was not triable under the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. PLD 2018 SC 178
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 148 & 149---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to court of ordinary jurisdiction---Prosecution alleged that nine nominated accused along with 5/6 other persons resorted to indiscriminate firing as a result whereof nine persons from the complainant side sustained multiple firearm injuries---Investigating officer, however, stated that only 11 empties of two different bores i.e. .30 bore and .12 bore were recovered during inspection of the spot---FIR also alleged that all the nominated accused were armed with multiple firearms but during investigation only .30 bore pistol and a 12 bore gun were recovered at the instance of only one accused---Empties secured from the spot and the recovered weapons were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for analysis and the report of FSL was in the negative---All the five prosecution witnesses (some of whom were injured) recorded their statements before the Magistrate under S. 164, Cr.P.C., wherein they by and large exonerated the nominated accused persons by stating that they did not know as to who fired at them; that none of the nominated accused fired at them nor they saw any weapon in the hands of any of the nominated accused persons---Prima facie, it appeared from the facts of the case that altercation between the parties occurred all of a sudden when the procession of the complainant side on winning the election was passing in front of house of accused party and there was no prior 'object/design'---Allegations levelled in the FIR, the material collected by the investigating agency during course of investigation and other surrounding circumstances showed that present case was not triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court---High Court had rightly directed the Anti-Terrorism Court to transfer the record of present case to the court of ordinary jurisdiction---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2017 SCMR 533
S. 353---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(h)---Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13---Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, act of terrorism, possession of weapon and ammunition without any valid licence---Reappraisal of evidence---Accused and co-accused persons were alleged to have fired at a police party which resulted in the death of a police official---Trial Court convicted the accused under S. 7(h) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 353, P.P.C and S. 13 of Arms Ordinance, 1965 and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment, which sentence was upheld by the High Court---Held, that sufficient evidence was available against the accused as he was apprehended from the spot, and recovery of motorcycle as well as rifle used during the occurrence was effected from him---Even otherwise material witnesses of prosecution were police officials who had no malice against the accused for his false implication in the case---Appeal filed by accused to the extent of charges under S. 353, P.P.C., S. 7(h), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and S. 13 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965 was dismissed . 2017 SCMR 1845
Ss. 7(a), (b) & (h)---Murder of police official to resist arrest---Re-appraisal of evidence---Death sentence, confirmation of---Accused was a proclaimed offender in many cases---Accused resisted his arrest by police, and started firing which caused the death of a police official---Crime empties recovered from the spot of occurrence matched with the weapon recovered from the accused---Five police officials appeared as eye-witnesses and during their cross-examination they remained firm on all major particulars of the case i.e. date, time and place of occurrence---Prosecution witnesses had no enmity with the accused to falsely implicate him in the present case---FIR was promptly registered i.e. thirty minutes after the time of occurrence, wherein accused was specifically nominated with a specific role---Such promptly lodged FIR excluded any chance of false implication---Prosecution had proved its case against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt---Death sentence awarded to accused was confirmed in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2016 SCMR 28
Ss. 302(b) & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Qatl-i-amd, unlawful assembly, acts of terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Death sentence, confirmation of---Five persons were brutally murdered during broad daylight on a road---Accused was convicted for the occurrence and sentenced to death---Validity---Scrutiny of evidence of eye-witnesses did not suggest any exaggeration rather not assigning any specific role to the accused in the FIR reflected the truthfulness of their testimony when in hustle and bustle of the occurrence which had been committed within a few seconds or minutes it was humanly impossible to assign specific role and give detailed description of the same---Lodging of the FIR in a straightforward manner in the fact and circumstances of the case ruled out any possibility of falsely roping the accused persons---Testimony of both the eye-witnesses was confidence inspiring and from the facts and circumstances of the case, they could not in any manner be considered to be chance witnesses---Motive for the occurrence was fully established to the extent of accused who was involved in another murder case of complainant's nephew and was allegedly extending threats to the complainant party to effect compromise---Medical evidence corroborated the ocular account---Recoveries had been effected which also corroborated the prosecution version---Parties were known to each other and FIR was promptly lodged, which ruled out any possibility of substitution or consultation to falsely rope in or involve the accused persons---Prosecution had fully succeeded in proving its case against the accused---Death sentence awarded to accused was maintained---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2016 SCMR 2152
S. 345(7)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b) & 338-E---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7(a) & 21-L---Qatl-i-amd, act of terrorism---Waiver or compounding of offence---Scope---Conviction and death sentence recorded under S. 302(b), P.P.C. and S. 7(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Offence under S. 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was an independent one, which was non-compoundable , thus the sentence awarded under said provision of law was independent to other sentences under S. 302(b), P.P.C. etc., which may be compoundable in nature---In view of the bar contained in S. 345(7), Cr.P.C., conviction of an accused under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would remain intact despite compromise in other sentences in compoundable offence. 2016 SCMR 291
Ss. 345, 367(2) & (3)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 34 & 404---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Accused charged with both compoundable and non-compoundable offences---Legal error committed by Trial Court in not recording separate conviction and sentence for the non-compoundable offence---High Court also failing to notice such error---Compromise between parties for the compoundable offence---Effect---Conviction and sentence for the non-compoundable offence had to be recorded separately and could not be implied---Matter of conviction and sentence for the non-compoundable offence had become a past and closed transaction---Compromise between the parties for the compoundable offence should not have been rejected in such circumstances. 2016 SCMR 1190
PCrLJ 2015 Kar 628
S. 345---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Qatl-i-amd, common intention, act of terrorism--- Compromise application--- Maintainability--- Compromise applications were filed by complainant/legal heirs of deceased during pendency of appeals---Offence under S.302, P.P.C. was compoundable by legal heirs of the victim, whereas offence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, had not been shown in the first and second column of table of S.345, Cr.P.C.---Such offence was not compoundable under the provisions of S. 345, Cr.P.C., as provisions of said section, could not be stretched too far by including therein a non-compoundable offence under the garb of humanitarian grounds; or on the ground that accused persons belonged to Rangers Force---Manner, in which brutal murder of the deceased was committed, caused sensation in society---Such offence being against society, it could not be permitted to be compounded by an individual/legal heir of the deceased on any score---Application filed for compounding of offence being without legal force, was dismissed, in circumstances.
PLD 2014 SC 809
Ss. 302(b) & 34--- Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(1)(b) & 7(a)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 345---Qatl-e-amd, common intention, act of terrorism---Compromise---Reappraisal of evidence---Murder of unarmed person by members of law enforcement agency---Grievous and heinous crime---Sense of fear or insecurity in the public---Accused and co-accused persons were members of a law enforcement agency, and they had a quarrel with the deceased at a park---Deceased was surrounded by accused and co-accused, whereafter one of the co-accused shouted "maromaro", as a result of which the accused fired at the deceased---Deceased pleaded to be taken to hospital, but accused and co-accused did not do the same, despite presence of an official vehicle at the spot---Deceased consequently bled to death---Accused deliberately and wilfully shot the deceased at the instigation of the co-accused persons and they let him bleed to death without offering him any assistance---Such sequence of events abundantly displayed the common intention and object of the accused and co-accused persons---Gruesome murder of deceased at the hands of members of law enforcement agency certainly created a sense of terror, insecurity and panic in the minds and hearts of those who witnessed the scene and the entire public which saw the video of the incident---Accused had compromised with legal heirs of deceased but offence committed by him and co-accused persons under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was not compoundable ---Supreme Court however observed that following the ratio in the case of Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 383), wherein sentence of death imposed upon convict under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was reduced to imprisonment for life in the presence of a compromise, the death sentence awarded to present accused should also be reduced to imprisonment for life---Sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to co-accused persons was maintained---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.
PLD 2014 SC 383
S. 345--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860),Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 148, 149 & 337-F(iii)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(m) & (n), 7(a), (c) & (h)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.188---Review of Supreme Court judgment---Murder of police official while on duty---………………..---Regarding first count of death sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C, accused entered into a compromise with legal heirs of deceased and compensation had also been paid, but second count of death under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had its own implications and was not compoundable under Ss.354(5) & (7), Cr.P.C---Compromise between parties was accepted (only) to the extent of conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C and accused was acquitted of said charge---Regarding death sentence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, quantum of said sentence could be examined in the present case due to its peculiar facts---Sentence of death awarded to accused under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was converted into life imprisonment without extending benefit of S.382-B, P.P.C, as the same was not allowed by Trial Court, High Court and the Supreme Court---Review petition was disposed of accordingly.
PCRLJ 2007 Lah 1097
---S. 7(e)---Appreciation of evidence---Abductee had rightly picked up all the three accused in the identification parade and had also identified them in the Court---Demand of ransom by the accused and payment of Rupees four Ins to them as such according to their instructions had been proved on record---Offence under S.7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being non-compoundable , any compromise between the parties was of no consequence---Accused had not led any evidence to establish their friendship with the abductee or regarding the complicity of the abductee himself in the crime---Entire ransom amount had been recovered from accused who were arrested by the police from the house on the pointation of abductee---Abductee had no motive for false implication of accused in the case---Incriminating recoveries from the accused including the ransom amount, pistols with live cartridges, mobile phone and motorcycle of abductee, had further connected the accused with the offence---Investigating Officer in the peculiar circumstances of the case could not possibly join persons from the public in recovery proceedings, even otherwise police, witnesses were as good witnesses as other witnesses---Recoveries had corroborated the evidence furnished by the prosecution witnesses---Even if the recoveries had not been proved in a case of kidnapping or abduction for ransom, the determining factor was the object behind the crime---Conviction and sentence of accused were upheld in circumstances.
2014 PLD 644 MUHAMMAD YOUSAF v State
Preamble, Third Sched., Ss.1, 6, 7, 23 & 34---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Transfer of case from Anti- Terrorism Court to regular court---Scope of S.23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Anti- Terrorism Court dismissed applications of accused involved in different offences namely murder by firing, acid throwing and injury caused by firing in mosque, for transfer of their cases to regular courts---Validity---Purpose of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was to prevent terrorism, sectarian violence and conducting speedy trial of heinous offences---In order to decide whether an offence was triable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or not, the courts had to see whether the act had tendency to create sense of fear and insecurity in the mind of people or a section of society---Such act might not necessarily have taken place within the view of general public---
Schedule annexed to a statute was as important as the statute itself---Schedule could be used to construe the provisions of the body of the Act---Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had to be given its due importance and, first three paragraphs of the same were general in nature while the fourth paragraph specifically described offences---In order to bring an offence within ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court, nexus of such offence with S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was a pre-requisite---
Paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 categorically mentioned the offences which would be tried only by the Anti-Terrorism Court---Offences in question were within the purview/ambit of the paragraph 4 of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and were triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court---Petitions were dismissed.
2014 PCrLJ 374 FEDERAL-SHARIAT-COURT NADEEM vs State
Preamble---Law did not make any distinction in the matter of appreciation of evidence in a case under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or under normal criminal law---Credibility of witnesses had to be measured with the same yardstick, whether it was an ordinary crime or a crime striking terror in society---Law did not make any distinction either in leading of evidence in its assessment---Rule was one and the same, that was intrinsic worth of testimony and the fact, that it stood the test of cross-examination---Contradictory versions of the prosecution witnesses made before Anti-Terrorism Court and then before court of ordinary jurisdiction, would shake the entire foundation of the prosecution case---By no stretch of imagination, it was possible to reconcile the conflicting statements of the same prosecution witnesses regarding the same event---Said contradiction would sufficiently furnish a clue to veracity of the testimony of those witnesses, and shake their trustworthiness.
2013 MLD 1872 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT-NWFP State vs KHAISTA RAHMAN
Preamble---Object---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was a special law purpose of which was to control terrorism---Schedule offences were made non-compoundable.
2012 PLD 122 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN MUHAMMAD RASOOL vs State
S. 12 & Preamble---Jurisdiction, determination of---Essentials---While determining jurisdiction it would be necessary to examine that the ingredients of the alleged occurrence have nexus with the object of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for determining whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design or purpose behind the same has to be seen---In case of any doubt with regard to the meaning of any particular provision, the Preamble of the Act may be considered to arrive at the proper conclusion---Preamble of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, clearly manifests that the same has been promulgated to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and other heinous offences as defined in S.6 of the said Act.
2012 PLD 122 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN MUHAMMAD RASOOL vs State
Preamble & S.32---Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2000), Preamble & S.14---
Distinguishing features of the two enactments---Under. Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, courts acquire jurisdiction if the offence is triable by them, whereas under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, courts acquire jurisdiction if offenders are juvenile, irrespective of the nature of offence committed by them--Provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, under its S.32 have the overriding effect over all other laws including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, whereas under S.14 of said Ordinance its provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force.
2012 PLD 22 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN GUL MUHAMMAD vs State
Preamble & S.6(2)(g)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Qatl-e-Amd---"Terrorism"---
Allegation of "Siyahkari"---Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---Any offence, where the offender would take the law in his own hands and awards punishment, that offence would fall within the purview of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Venue of the commission of a crime, the time of occurrence, the motive and the fact that whether or not said crime had been witnessed by public at large, were not the only determining factors for deciding the issue, whether a case did or did not fall within the parameters of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Crucial question would be whether said crime had or had not the effect of striking terror or creating a sense of fear and insecurity in the people or any section of the people---Accused, in the present case, had committed the murder of three innocent people on the false allegation of 'Siyahkari', while taking the law in his own hands, such act certainly would have created a sense of fear, panic and terror amongst the villagers---No licence could be granted to anyone to take the law of the land in his own hands and start executing the culprits himself, instead of taking them to the court of law---Murder based on "Ghairat" did not furnish a valid mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser sentence---Killing of innocent people, specially the women on to pretext of 'Siyahkari' was un-Islamic, illegal and unconstitutional---Under S.6(2)(g) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, in case of unjustified murder by a person, who on account of his immorality or to satisfy his brutal instinct, would take the law in his own hands, was responsible for creating sensation and panic in the society---Offences committed on the pretext of 'Siyahkari' would fall within the domain of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and all the cases pending before the ordinary courts would stand transferred to the Anti-Terrorism Courts.
2012 PLD 22 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN GUL MUHAMMAD vs : State
Ss. 302(b) & 311---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Preamble & Ss.6(2)(g), 7(a)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.345---Qatl-e-amd---Tazir after waiver or compounding of right of qisas in qatl-e-amd---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was enacted for prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and speedy trial of heinous offences-Said Act being a special law, private complainant or the legal heirs of the deceased, had no right to compound the "scheduled offence" as those offences were mainly against the State and not against individuals---Offences could not be compounded automatically by legal heirs, but were always through the court; and the court could decline the permission to compromise the offence by the legal heirs of victim---
Even the ordinary courts under S.311, P.P.C., could punish accused, if the offence had been compounded, by the legal heirs, on the basis of "Fasad-Fil-Arz"---Not providing the right to compromise the offence by the legal heirs of deceased, was neither violation of Islamic Injunctions; nor of any fundamental rights.
2011 YLR 1319 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH : Syeda ZAHIDA RIZVI vs : THE STATE through D.S.P.
Preamble, Ss.2(t), 13, 17 & 21-M---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.182---Giving false information with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to cause injury to another person---
Purpose of enactment of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1990---Powers of Anti-Terrorism Court to try a person accused of offence under S.182, P.P. C. ---Scope---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1990 which provided for the establishment of Anti-Terrorism Court as evident from its preamble, was enacted for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violation and speedy trial of heinous offence and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto---Purpose of establishment of Anti- Terrorism Court as envisaged in S.13 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was to provide a court for speedy trial of scheduled offences---"Scheduled offence" as defined by S.2(t) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was an offence as set out in the Third Schedule of the Ordinance---Anti-Terrorism Court, while trying an accused of a scheduled offence could also try such person for an offence which did not find mention in the scheduled of offences by trying it as a matter connected and incidental to a schedule offence as envisaged under S.21-M of the Act---Anti-Terrorism Court had no jurisdiction to try an accused for an offence which did not find mention in the schedule of offences---Offence under S.182, P.P. C., did not find mention in the scheduled offences to Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, his trial before the Anti-Terrorism Court appeared to be without jurisdiction.
2011 PLD 1 FEDERAL-SHARIAT-COURT Mian ABDUR RAZZAQ AAMIR vs FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
Preamble---Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979), Preamble---
Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance (VIII of 1979), Preamble---Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order (4 of 1979), Preamble---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), Preamble---Anti Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Preamble---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.203-DD---Revisional and other jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court---Scope---Final or interim orders passed or judgments delivered by trial courts exercising jurisdiction on criminal side with regard to offences covered by the term "Hudood",
whether mentioned in Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979; Offence of Zina Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979; Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979; Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979; Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997; Anti Terrorism Act, 1997; Penal Code, 1860 or any other law for the time being in force, can be challenged by way of appeal or otherwise only before the Federal Shariat Court and no other court of criminal jurisdiction is competent to entertain and adjudicate upon proceedings connected with Hudood offences---Initiation of proceedings to quash First Information Report or pending criminal proceeding related to Hudood matters are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court in view of the mandate of Art.203-DD of the Constitution---Remedy against grant or refusal of bail before or during the trial of any of the above mentioned offences lies before Federal Shariat Court alone and no other court has jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in such